



Economists continue to debate whether
money is the only or even the primary cause
of inflation. Few, however, would deny that
money affects inflation with a lag. This propo-
sition has been confirmed by studies of a va-
riety of countries and historical periods. In
most cases, money's effect upon prices has
been found to continue for several years' time,
although the precise lag often seems to vary
substantially.
1
Partly as a result of these studies, estimates
of the lagged relation between money and
prices are widely used for such purposes as
forecasting inflation. But this lagged relation
has implications that go well beyond the pre-
diction of inflation. If money changes are not
immediately and fully reflected in prices, they
will lead in the short run to variations in real
balances and real liquidity, which in turn may
affect interest rates and real aggregate de-
mand. Indeed, it is widely believed that money
affects real economic activity in the short run
because its impact upon prices is delayed. 2 This
view is reflected in many of the formal econo-
metric models used in business and govern-
ment, where the timing of money's impact
upon prices is critical in determining short-run
effects of monetary policy on the real sector.
But despite its widespread application, little
is known empirically about the factors deter-
mining the money-inflation lag. Indeed, the
very reasons for its existence are controversial.
A common and traditional view is that the lag
stems from institutional and technical factors--
'Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Kirk McAllister and Christopher Dunn provided research
assistance for this article.
30
e.g., contracts and adjustment costs- that
prevent prices from adjusting immediately to
money changes. Also, according to this view,
such factors presumably are unaffected by
monetary policy. This proposition, if true,
greatly simplifies the task of policy analysts,
since it implies that estimates of the money-
inflation relation derivedunderone type ofpol-
icy will remain valid under another. Past be-
havior, that is, provides a relatively unambig-
uous guide to the future in this case.
In recent years, with the growing under-
standing of the influence of individuals' expec-
tations upon behavior, such mechanistic views
of the lags in economic relations have been
challenged. Few would deny that institutional
and technical "frictions" such as contracts, ad-
justment costs, and imperfect information are
partly responsible for the lag between money
and prices. Nonetheless, basic economic the-
ory suggests that the decisions individuals
make when faced with such factors often de-
pend critically upon their anticipations about
the future. In some industries, for example,
contractual arrangements prevent prices from
adjusting immediately to a change in money.
It could be supposed that anticipations have
little or no influence upon the length and gen-
eral form of such contracts, since these fea-
tures often are largely determined by custom,
law, and industry characteristics. But the price
specified in any contract will depend upon firm
perceptions of future costs and demand, and
hence implicitly upon judgments about future
inflation and (thus) monetary policy.
This suggests that the lags in money-infla-
tion as well as other economic relations result
from the interaction of two basic sets of fac-tors. On the one hand, there are various "fric-
tions" and "imperfections"-factors that are
determined largely by technology, precedent,
law, and other institutional characteristics that
change very slowly with anticipations, and
then only if these depart fairly radically from
past experience. But interacting with these fac-
tors are individuals' expectations, particularly
their perceptions as to how current and past
conditions relate to those in the future. Given
that interaction, the lag between money and
prices (and analogous lags in other economic
relations) is likely to change when government
policies are altered, because then individuals'
expectations can be expected to change.
Plainly then, the extent to which expecta-
tions influence the money-inflation lag has
potentially far-reaching practical implications
for policy formulation. If expectations are im-
portant, the relations used to predict inflation
and real-output responses to money are apt to
shift when basic policy is altered. To assess the
effects of alternative policies realistically, we
are likely to need an explicit identification of
the role of expectations in determining the
money-inflation lag, because only in this way
will we be able to predict shifts in the relation.
Ifexpectations are as important as some econ-
omists believe, policy analysts will have to con-
sider them more explicitly than they generally
have in the past.
This paper discusses how expectations about
monetary policy may affect the lag between
money and prices. Basically, we argue that
price decisions made now are likely to be
based upon individuals' anticipations about the
level of money in the future. If true, the con-
sequences are very important for the forecast-
ing of inflation, the evaluation of prospective
policies, and the testing of alternative theories
of inflation. Normally, inflation forecasts are
based upon data on current and past money
growth and, in some cases, other variables; the
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same relations are usually employed in pre-
dicting the impact of prospective policies. If
prices are actually based upon forecasts of fu-
ture money, such relations will reflect the way
in which predictions of future money are cal-
culated from current and past data. For this
reason, basic changes in monetary policy are
likely to alter the lag between money and
prices, because such changes are likely to lead
individuals (at least eventually) to revise their
forecasting methods. Following Lucas (1970)
and Sargent andWallace (1976), our arguments
criticize those procedures which use economic
relations observed under one set of policies to
predict the consequences of different policies.
Section I of the paper summarizes explana-
tions that have been offered for the lag be-
tween money and prices. Nearly all of these
explanations suggest that prices will be based,
directly or indirectly, upon forecasts of future
money (see appendix for technical details).
Estimates presented for several countries sug-
gest, tentatively, that expectations may have
significantlyinfluencedmoney-inflationlags. For
policy purposes, however, we must identify the
way in which expectations affect such empiri-
cal relations between money and prices; only
thencanwe determinehowinflation-forecasting
methods must be revised when policy is al-
tered.
In Section II we discuss the implications of
a relatively simple but potentially powerful hy-
pothesis-that prices respond more to money
changes that are perceived as permanent or
persistent than to those seen as transient, with
that response itself being relatively unaffected
by policy. This suggests that the empirical re-
lation between inflation and actual money will
depend crucially upon how individuals view
the future sustainability of such changes in
money. The (crude) evidence cited here pro-
vides only mixed support for this view, but the
hypothesis merits further research.I. Lags Between Money and Prices
(1)
In the long-run, it is widely believed, sus-
tained changes in money merely lead to vari-
ations in all prices in the same proportion with-
out affecting real output, interest rates, or
relative prices. ("Sustained" changes are those
that are neither augmented nor diminished in
the future.) This proposition, which is known
as the (long-run) neutrality of money, is based
intuitively on the fact that a rise in money and
all prices in the same proportion leaves the
"typical" individual's real balances, real
wealth, and real income unaffected; since that
individual's consumption, savings, work, and
leisure opportunities are unaltered by the
money change, his decisions similarly should
not be affected.
3 A substantial amount of evi-
dence suggests, at least for the U.S., that
money is at least approximately neutral in this
sense.
4 Ofcourse the neutrality ofmoney does
not imply that money changes are the only
sources of change in the aggregate price level;
it is also affected by changes in real income,
interest rates, oil prices and other variables
which influence the demand for money. How-
ever, historical studies, particularly the mon-
umental Monetary History ofthe United States
by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), have estab-
lished that variations in money growth account
for most variations in long-term inflation rates.
This long-run relation suggests the use of
money to predict inflation in the short-run.
However, even casual observation reveals that
money changes do not lead immediately to
proportional changes in the price level, but
that they are associated initially with changes
in real output and interest rates. Most econo-
mists would agree that this short-run departure
from neutrality originates in factors that pre-
vent prices from responding immediately and
proportionately to money changes, and that
the subsequent change in real balances leads
to interest-rate and real-output changes that
further influence the "transmission" of money
to prices.
More formally, we can distinguish between
long-run and short-run effects. In the long-run,
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prices vary proportionately with nominal ag-
gregate demand, which itself changes in the
same proportion as money. In the short-run,
however, money is not fully reflected in prices,
but "spills over" into real income and interest
rates, which in turninfluenceaggregate demand
and prices. This series of adjustments of prices
to money, direct as well as via money's effect
on output and interest rates, is reflected in re-
lations used to predict prices and inflation from
rrioI1ey~gfowth data. Such relations are com-
monly written in the form,
p(t) = aom(t) + a]m(t-l) +
...anm(t-n) + z(t)
or more commonly in change-form as
6.p(t) ao6.m(t) + a}6.m(t-1) +
...an6.m(t-n) + 6.z(t) (1')
where p is the log of aggregate prices, m is the
log of the money stock, and z(t) stands for all
other non-monetary variables affecting prices,
such as long-run trends in real output and
money velocity; here 6.p(t) refers to the change
in pO, that is p(t)-p(t-l) and similarly for
6.m(t).5 Again, the lags reflect not only money's
direct effect upon prices but also its indirect
effects operating via short-run changes in real
output and interest rates.
6 What is the source
of these lags, and how may they be influenced
by individuals' expectations about monetary
policy?
Reasons for Lags
Until recently, lags between money and
prices were commonly explained as reflections
of disequilibria in commodity and labor mar-
kets. According to this essentially Keynesian
approach, prices and quantities in a market
generally differ from their equilibrium values
as determined by the intersection of market
supply-and-demand schedules. In this view,
prices and quantities adjust gradually and
fairly mechanically toward their equilibria in
response to excess demand-the gap between
demand and supply at current prices. Moneythus affects aggregate demand initially, with
prices responding only later and gradually to
the resulting excess demands in commodity
and labor markets. This adjustment process
was (at least implicitly) supposed to depend
upon institutional features of the market, and
not upon monetary policy or expectations
about it. However, economists have become
increasingly skeptical of this view, since it im-
plies that producers deliberately prolong a
state of excess demand even when they are
free to vary prices.
7
More "modern" explanations of the money-
inflation lag suggest the potentially crucial na-
ture of individuals' expectations about policy.
According to one argument, prices fail to re-
spond immediately and fully to money changes
because of an information lag between the
time a change in aggregate money occurs and
the time individuals find out about it. Under
this view, money changes that are perceived
by individuals are immediately and fully incor-
porated in prices, with no effect upon real out-
put; perceived money changes, that is, are
neutral even in the short-run. However, be-
cause of lags in the publication and dissemi-
nation of government statistics, individuals
generally do not know the level of the current
money stock, but must estimate its value based
upon their knowledge of current and past eco-
nomic conditions. When their estimates are
"incorrect," actual aggregate demand will dif-
fer from the level perceived by consumers and
firms. For example, when money rises by more
than is anticipated, a typical firm experiences
an increase in demand for its product that is
apparently greater than the increase it per-
ceives in aggregate demand. Consequently,
firms generally raise real output in response.
But because of the adjustment costs involved
in varying output and employment levels,
firms usually will need a considerable amount
of time to return to their original levels of
output, even after they find out the true level
of the money stock. These output changes in
turn may account for the protracted response
of observed money-price effects.s
Another explanation of the delay in the
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monetary impact emphasizes lags in the re-
sponse ofaggregate demand itself. Specifically,
individuals may shift their demands more in
response to changes in money that are viewed
as persistent than to transient changes. This
suggests that aggregate demand will vary pro-
portionately with the average of current and
past money growth-the best reflection ofper-
manent money changes-rather than only to
changes in the current money stock. Further-
more, aggregate demand may be influenced by
interest rates, which respond to expectations
of future inflation. This means that current ag-
gregate demand will depend upon expectations
of future money growth-the likely basis of
expectations offuture inflation-and thus indi-
rectly upon observed current and past money
changes (to the extent they indicate future
money changes).9 In either case, there may be
a lag between money and prices, even when
prices respond immediately and fully to cur-
rent aggregate demand.
Neither of these explanations involves any
impediments to the adjustment of prices to
aggregate demand. In practice, however, such
impediments almost surely exist. In some in-
dustries, for example, prices and wages are set
for protracted periods by contracts which con-
tain only limited indexing provisions. In many
activities, furthermore, prices are constrained
by implicit agreements that limit the frequency
of price changes. For example, when a de-
partment-store chain mails out a catalogue it
makes a tacit agreement to honor the listed
prices-even when it is not legally bound to
do so. Why do firms voluntarily limit their
price responsiveness to current demand con-
ditions? One important motivation may be the
customer loyalty that firms gain by offering a
more stable and predictable price than they
would offer if they responded-to every shift in
demand.
lO In any case, firms that set fixed
prices over a certain period are likely to fore-
cast the level ofdemand for that period, which
means that they will (at least implicitly) make
judgments about future levels of the money
stock.Expectations and Inflation Prediction
All except the first of our explanations of
the money-price lag imply that current prices
depend, directly or indirectly, upon firms' and
individuals' forecasts of money over some
(generally considerable) future interval. This
is perhaps most obvious when prices are fixed
by explicit or implicit contracts, because price
setters then will have to assess the probable
level of demand prevailing over the contract
life. But producers' judgments about the di-
vision of current money into transient or per-
manent components also involve predictions
about future money. Furthermore, producers'
strategies about changesin future output lev-
els, in the interval before prices respond fully
to money, are likely to depend upon their pro-
jections of future money.II
The implications of this money-price rela-
tion for predictionsofinflation depend crucially
upon how the forecasts of future money are
made. Let us assume that predictions offuture
money are based entirely upon past observa-
tions of money growth. Then, the above anal-
ysis suggests, the timing of money's effect
upon prices depends upon two sets of factors:
a) Rigidities and imperfections that are largely
determined by institutional structures, prece-
dent or law, and/or technical factors that are
largely unaffected by all but drastic changes in
expectations and policy. (Examples are con-
tracts, costs of adjusting output and employ-
ment, and factors generating incomplete infor-
mation about conditions relevant to individuals'
decisions); and b) The relation used by indi-
viduals to forecast future money, in particular
the relation they perceive between already ob-
served money changes and those they antici-
pate in the future.
It follows that money-price relations, such
as (1), are likely to remain unaffected by mon-
etary-policy changes only if individuals do not
change the way they forecast future money.
But this is unlikely to be the case in the event
of major policy changes; however crude their
forecasting techniques, individuals are likely
to adapt their forecasts eventually to changing
conditions. 12
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Also, according to this view, information on
variables that do not directly affect prices but
which aid individuals in predicting money
should be useful in predicting current as well
as future inflation. Sunspot activity is unlikely
of itself to affect aggregate prices-but if sun-
spots are useful in predicting future money,
analysts must take them into account in as-
sessing current and future inflation develop-
ments. In other words, knowledge of the fac-
tors that directly cause price changes is only a
partial guide to their prediction.
l3
Some Evidence
Analysts normallydevelop inflation forecasts
from relations similar to (1) without explicitly
accounting for individuals' expectations. Fre-
quently they estimate the forecasting relation
on the basis of data for all or most of the post-
World War II period; the result then reflects
some "average" of the monetary policies pre-
vailing over the entire period. But as our anal-
ysis suggests, this procedure may lead to seri-
ously biased inflation forecasts if monetary
policy has changed substantially and if individ-
uals' expectations have changed to reflect this
fact. The appropriate relation for forecasting
inflation may be unstable, that is, may vary over
time.
How important a practical problem this pre-
sents is an empirical question. The lag between
money and inflation may primarily reflect insti-
tutional factors and adjustment costs, rather
than expectations, in which case the lag should
not vary perceptibly with policy. Alternatively,
policies themselves may not vary substantially
over time; or expectations about policy may
change only very gradually. If any of these
statements are true, relations such as (1) may
not be very different now from what they were
twenty years ago.
A direct, although crude, way to measure
the role of expectations is to see how money-
inflation relations vary from period to period.
This we have done with the relation between
quarterly consumer-price changes and current
and past money growth for several industrial
countries, including the U.S., for the 1961-78period as well as two sub-periods, 1961-70 and After 1970, however, U.S. and foreign infla-
1971-78 (Table 1). We used the "narrow" (M- tion rates increasingly diverged, leading by
1) definition of money, partly because data for 1973 to a complete breakdown of the fixed-
the entire period were available only on that exchange-rate system. Thus monetary poliCies
basis. 14 In deriving these estimates, we in- abroad (at least) may now be less constrained
cluded an additional variable -an average of than they were in the earlier period, which
the current and eleven previous quarters' raises the question whether this shift is re-
growth in real balances-to help correct for flected in the money-inflation relation for these
variations in the trend of real money demand countries. The crudeness of our estimates re-
arising, for example, from financial innova- flects theuseofseveralsimplifyingassumptions.
tions. (A similar correction is used in the In particular, we assume that non-money fac-
Keran-Zeldes article in this Review). Also, to tors affecting inflation (not captured by the
help correct for the effects of oil-price in- money-demand correction) varied at a con-
creases on real income growth, we included a stant average rate during the estimation pe-
dummy variable for the period 1974-78. 15 riod, and that deviations from this rate were
The choice of sub-periods reflects the differ- unrelated to money growth.
16 This and other
ent international monetary arrangements in simplifying assumptions may account for some
force during those two periods. From 1961 of the anomalies of the results.
through 1970, foreign countries' monetary pol- Our results suggest that the long-run impact
icies were constrained by the need to maintain of money on prices frequently is significantly
a fixed value of their currency in terms of the different from unity. This might appear to con-
dollar. Under the then-prevailing dollar stan- tradict the proposition of money neutrality,
dard, foreign inflation rates could not differ which implies that an increase in money that
from U.S. inflation rates over the long run. is sustained will eventually raise all prices in
Table 1
Relationship of Inflation and Money Growth 1961-78
Belg. Can. France Ger. It. Japan Neth. Switz. U.K. U.S.
1961.1-1970.4
Money Demand Trend' .57 .13 .07 -1.16 - .55 -.97 -2.51 .19 -1.26' 1.10'
Long-run Money Impact .63' .15' - .39' 1.17' 1.343 .59 -.07' - .17 1.16' 1.2621
Adjusted R' .25 .55 .23 .23 .21 - .03 .28 .01 .37 .88
1971.1-1978.4
Money Demand TrendS .009 .16 .48' .78' -1.23' 1.283 1.08' -1.19' - .71' .66'
1974-78 Shift Term6 - .0123 NI - .020' - .006' NI .023' -.009' NI NI NI
Long-run Money Impact 3.15' .26' 2.11' 1.493 2.5821 2.39' 2.903 1.18' - .14' 4.9921
Adjusted R' .69 .55 .79 .60 .50 .55 .51 .77 .65 .75
1961.1-1978.4
Money Demand TrendS .20 .06 -.04 - .73' .50' .41 -1.04' - .62' .45' -.04
1974-78 Shift Term6 - .0093 NI .002 - .005' NI .020' - .0083 NI NI NI
Long-run Money Impact 1.003 .22' .01' 1.21' 2.06' 1.38' .733 1.16' .04' 1.56'
Adjusted R' .50 .80 .67 .52 .68 .40 .29 .58 .73 .82
F Test for Homogeneity 5.65' 1.61 5.41' 3.79' 1.94 2.08 3.68' 2.52' 3.48' 5.46'
NI: Not included (see note 6).
'Significantly different from unity at the 5% level.
'Significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
3Significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
'Indicates that the null hypothesis that all the slope coefficients are the same in the two periods can be rejected at (at
least) the 5% level.
'Defined as the average long-run growth of real balances over the current and previous 11 quarters.
6Included in the reported results only if its value was significantly different from zero at the 10% level; otherwise the
equation excludes the variable.
35proportion. Of course, such sustained in-
creases would be typical only under certain
monetary policies; current money increases
often will be followed by offsetting or rein-
forcing money growth in the future. But if the
money-inflation relation is the same regardless
of the choice of monetary policy, and if money
is neutral, the long-run impact of money on
prices should be unity-since it should be the
same under one policy as under any other. Yet
as shown below, this impact will generally not
be unity if the lag between money and prices
is influenced by anticipations about future
money growth. Our finding thus provides in-
direct evidence that anticipations help deter-
mine the timing of money's effect upon prices.
Further evidence (again indirect) is provided
by the apparent significant shift in the money-
inflation relation between the two subperiods;
the hypothesis that the relation is the same for
both is nearly rejected for Italy and Japan, and
is easily rejected for all other countries except
Canada. This finding is particularly striking in
view of the fact that the long-run impact of
money on prices generally increased from the
first subperiod to the second. (However, this
is not true of the V .K., where the later-period
results are rather implausible). This might be
expected, however, because we may suppose
that foreign countries' money growth was sub-
stantially constrained by V.S. growth during
the period of fixed exchange rates.
The evidence in Table 1 is thus consistent
with the proposition that expectations influ-
ence the money-inflation lag. The relation ap-
pears to shift between the two subperiods, pos-
sibly reflecting the difference in constraints on
foreigners' monetary policy. In addition, the
long-run impact ofmoney on prices often does
not equal unity, as. would be the case if the
relation were valid under any monetary policy.
This evidence is far from conclusive, however,
particularly as there are other possible expla-
nations of the apparent shift between the sub-
periods. In particular, autonomous domestic
price changes themselves may have served to
reduce domestic money via international re-
serve changes during the fixed-rate period; and
such feedback from domestic prices to money
could bias our estimates downward. Prelimi-
nary tests indicate that such an influence may
have been important for Germany, Japan, and
the V.K. during this period, although it was
less significant (if at all) for the othercountries
considered.!7
II. Response to Permanent and Transient Money Changes
The mere observation that expectations can
cause money-inflation relations to vary is oflit-
tle use for practical policy analysis. To improve
inflation forecasts, we must know precisely how
expectations affect the timing of money's im-
pact upon prices, as well as how these expec-
tations are determined. This is potentially a
very difficult task, especially as anticipations
may interact with other sources of the money-
inflation lag in complex ways.
Nonetheless, our arguments suggest a sim-
ple but potentially powerful explanation of the
lagged relation between prices and money.
This explanation is based upon the hypothesis
of a stable relation --one unaffected by mon-
etary policy-not between prices and actual
money, but between prices and that part of
36
money changes perceived as persistent or per-
manent. In this view, prices respond more to
the permanent than to the transient part of
money variations. Even if only approximately
correct, this view provides some useful guide-
lines as to how inflation forecasting relations
should be altered when policy is substantially
changed. This approach and its implications
are described in detail below, with a more tech-
nical development left to the appendix.
Prices and Permanent Money
An earlier argument suggested that prices in
individual industries are based upon an aver-
age of the level of money expected to prevail
over some future horizon. Consider, for ex-
ample, the situation confronting a firm whichmust fix its price by contract for several pe-
riods. The demand for the firm's product over
the life of the contract may be primarily de-
termined by the level of aggregate demand
which (to simplify matters) we may assume
varies proportionately with the money stock.
Now if the firm sets too high a price relative
to expected demand, it will be unable to sell
all it produces and thus must carry inventories
at some cost; if it sets too Iowa price, it will
have to delay deliveries, speed up production
schedules, and/or draw down inventories from
desired levels, all of which entail additional
costs. Hence the firm may try to set an average
price that would ensure that sales equal output
over the contract period.IS This average will
then depend upon the expected level of aggre-
gate demand over the contract period, so that
in setting its price the firm must forecast some
average of the money stock over its planning
horizon. Alternatively, suppose that all prices
vary simultaneously with aggregate demand,
but that (nominal) demand depends upon in-
dividuals' expected "permanent" level of
money-that is, upon an average of the money
balances they expect to have now and in the
future. It should be clear, at least intuitively,
that prices again will depend upon an average
of money levels expected in the future. (The
appendix demonstrates this point, and also
demonstrates that the dependence of aggre-
gate demand upon interest rates is likely to
lead to a similar conclusion).
Suppose then that prices in industry "i" vary
proportionately with an average ofthe level of
money expected now and in the future. This
average (permanent money) can be written
without any essential loss of generality as,
m*(t) = ~I [m(t) + ,mC(t + I) +
n+
,mC(t+ 1) + ... ,mC(t+n)J (2)
where m*(t) is the logarithm of permanent
money, m(t) is the log ofthe current aggregate
money stock, and ,me(t + j) is the log of money
currently (at t) anticipated j periods in the
future. In other words, m*(t) is individuals'
current anticipation of the average level of
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money over their future planning horizon. 19
Itfollows that prices in industry "i" will vary
proportionately with permanent money, or,
(3)
where. Pi(t) is the log of industry i's price. (To
simplify the discussion, we may neglect all
otherfactors affecting the demand for and sup-
ply of firm products.)20 Since the aggregate
price level is simply an average of industry
prices, •it too will vary proportionately with
permanentmoney; more precisely, if all.antic-
ipated future money stocks rise by a given
proportion, the aggregate price level will even-
tually increase by that proportion. However,
when prices are set by contracts, the response
of the aggregate price level to a change in
permanent money is likely to be substantially
slower than that for an individual industry. In
a contract situation, some prices composing
the current aggregate price index, having been
set earlier, will be based upon past permanent
money; thus the aggregate price level will re-
spond to an average of current and past per-
manent-money levels.
21
The pricing strategy outlined above tends to
diminish the impact of perceived transient
money changes on inflation. That is, monetary
variations which individuals view as transient
~ave little or no effect upon their estimates of
permanent money, and thus little effect upon
prices. In principle, this general strategy is sen-
sible whatever policy is followed by the mon-
etary authorities. Of course, the exact relation
between aggregate prices and permanent
money depends upon firms' forecasting hori-
zons, which influences their calculation ofper-
manent money, and depends also upon con-
tract durations and the timing of renewals-all
ofwhich could be affected by monetary-policy
decisions. However, these characteristics are
based upon industrial-organization patterns
and other institutional features that generally
change slowly and that generally remain un-
affected by all but the most dramatic policy
shifts. Thus, at least upon examination we may
view relation (2) as invariant to expectations
about policy.Forecasting Inflation
What are the consequences of our perma-
nent money-price relation for the prediction of
inflation? Normally analysts use current and
past data in forecasting future prices and thus
inflation-because, after all, expectations are
not directly observable. Inour view, however,
prices do not respond directly to actual money,
but only to individuals' perceptions of perma-
nent money.
Nonetheless, current and past money data
may be useful in predicting inflation, because
individuals normally use such data in forecast-
ing future money and thus in assessing per-
manentmoney. Relations betweeninflation and
current and past money growth, such as (1'),
then reflect individuals' perceptions of how ob-
served money changes relate to future, and
therefore permanent, money. In other words,
an inflation forecaster must "predict" individu-
als' perceptions of permanent money, and in
particular determine how individuals use cur-
rent and past money in anticipating future
money.
In practice, we are not likely to know exactly
how individuals calculate permanent money.
However, individuals are likely to learn, by
observation, how a particular monetary policy
operates-provided it has been followed for a
long-enough period of time-and thus their
forecasts offuture money will tendto reflect the
way money has actually behaved. Analysts can
follow the same thought processes, and thus
can estimate what individuals' expectations
will be in the context of any specific monetary
policy.
The impact of past money on inflation ac-
cordingly reflects the way in which permanent
money is calculated. This conclusion has im-
portant consequences for the relations we have
used to forecast prices. If our view is correct,
the long-run impact of money on prices appar-
ent from these relations will not generally be
unity (even assuming that money is neutral);
rather the measured impact will be that of
current money onpermanent mQney.22 Impos-
ing the constraint of unity could lead to mis-
leading inflation.forecasts.except under certain
limited policy conqitions. In contrast, our ap-
proach could provide a possible explanation of
the changes in the impact of money on prices
observed between the 1960's and 1970's (Table
1).
Consider, for example, a situation where in-
dividuals know that the monetary authorities
have adopted a certain target path for money,
and also know that the authorities will correct
for deviations from the target path in the pe-
riod following any such misses (Figure 1, Case
1). Changes in money that bring its level above
or below the target path are then transient;
that is, they exert virtually no impact on per-
manent money. Indeed, individuals in any pe-
riod will expect that money will be on target
by next period. Apart from this path, current
inflation will be unrelated to past money
growth-since this provides no additional in-
formation about future money and thus very
little about permanent money-and the meas-
ured long-run impact of money on the price
level will be essentially zero.
Now consider a policy situation where
money changes are purely random. Imagine,
for example, that money growth is determined
by the spin of a roulette wheel, with money
growing by the winning number when it is red
Case 1
(Money Change
Viewed As Transient) Effect on:
Figure 1
Effects of a One-Percent Increase in Money














less than one percent
Rise by one percent
Increases hy one percent
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Rise hy more than one
percent
Increases hy more than one
percentand declining when it is black. Average money
changes will then be zero, but at any given
time the level of money expected in the future
will be the same as what is now prevailing
(Case 2). The level of expected future money,
and thus permanent money, will then shift up
and down with current money growth. That is,
a rise in current money will signal an increase
in permanent money and thus a proportional
increase in prices. Inflation and current money
growth will certainly be related- and inflation
may also be related to past money growth if
contracts prevent some industries from adjust-
ing immediately-and the long-run impact of
current money growth on prices will be unity.
Finally, consider the case where money
growth exceeds its long-run average and re-
mains above target in succeeding periods. In-
dividuals perceiving this pattern will then raise
their estimates ofpermanent money more than
proportionally whenever they observe money
growth rising (Case 3). Such accelerations
generally will lead eventually to more-than-
proportionate increases in the price level, so
that the measured impact of money on prices
in this case will be greater than one.
To summarize, we argue that a money-price
forecasting relation reflects the way in which
individuals predict future money, not primarily
the causal links between money and prices.
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If true, this has several important implications
for the forecasting of future prices, and hence
inflation. First, the total effect of money on
prices measured from such relations generally
will not be unity, and should not be constrained
to be so. The more persistent the current
money changes, the more they will ultimately
affect prices. Second, when other variables,
such as government deficits, provide informa-
tion about both past and future money, they
should be used in the forecasting of inflation.
Even if money were the only direct cause of
inflation, accurate predictions of prices gener-
ally will also involve other variables; in other
words, because of the complex social and po-
litical natureofinflation, individuals should rely




flow important are these considerations in
practice? Consider the case where the mone-
taryauthorities switch from a policy of offset-
ting monetary deviations to one of constant
accelerated growth. So long as individuals con-
tinue to predict future money as before, infla-
tionforecasters utilizing data based on the in-
itial policy will continue to be reasonably
successful. But once individuals learn of the
new policy, the old forecasting relation will
seriously underpredict inflation. This relation
wiUpredict relatively small price responses be-
cause iUs based upon a period in which money
changes were normally transient; once individ-
uals learn that new money changes are more
permanent, actual price responses will be
much greater.
Evidence Reconsidered
Our arguments help explain certain features
of the money-inflation relation summarized in
Table 1. As we saw, the long-run impact of
money on prices was greatest for the U.S. Fur-
thermore, the long-run impact was generally
higher during the 1970's than during the
1960's; the impact generally was below one
during the 1960's, but equal to or above one
during the 1970's. However, our permanent
money-inflation theory suggests an explanation
for this shift, based on the different interna-
tional monetary arrangements prevailing dur-
ing the two decades.
During the 1960's, foreign nations at-
tempted to maintain a fixed value for their
currencies in terms of the dollar. Such a policy
required that foreign prices rise at the same
rate as those in the U.S., at least on average.
This in turn meant that foreign money growth
was effectively constrained by U.S. growth. If
foreign money growth was too high, for ex-
ample, prices oftradedgoods produced abroad
would tend to rise faster than those in the
U.S., eroding the competitiveness of foreign
industries. The resulting trade and balance-of-
payments deficits then would render such a
policy incompatible with maintenance of a
fixed exchange rate. In effect, foreign moneygrowth had to follow a path determined by
U.S. money, at least in the long-run. U.S.
monetary policy, on the other hand, was much
less constrained by its balance of payments, in
part because our economy was much less open
than abroad, and in part because U.S. dollars
were the primary reserves held by foreign cen-
tral banks.
Under these circumstances, foreign money
changes that diverged from U.S. money
growth could not persist indefinitely. Perhaps
a significant portion of money growth abroad
was viewed as transitory; if so, this could ex-
plain why the long-run effect of money on
prices abroad was generally below unity (and
below the U.S. figure) during this period.
Also, perhaps U.S. money growth provided
information about the future direction of for-
eign money growth, in which case it should
have been useful in forecasting foreign infla-
tion as well. Logue and Sweeney provide in-
direct evidence of this, by finding that foreign
nominal income changes were frequently ex-
plained much better by foreign and U.S.
money growth than by foreign money changes
alone.
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During most of the 1970's, in contrast, coun-
tries were not officially committed to main-
taining fixed exchange rates, so that in princi-
ple, foreign nations were able to vary their
money supply independently of any U.S. ac-
tions. A higher proportion of foreign money
changes thus could be viewed as permanent,
which might help account for the fact that the
long-run effect of money now appears gener-
ally to be higher than before.26 On the other
hand, all countries do not exploit their mone-
tary independence; some have adapted their
policies to others in an attempt to limit fluc-
tuations in the value of their currency. Can-
ada's policy, for example, has been designed
in part to limit variations in the value of its
currency in terms of the U.S. dollar, even dur-
ing the 1970's. Not surprisingly, then, the long-
run impact of money on prices apparently re-
mains below one, and although higher than
the 1960's, is not substantially so.
Our explanation assumes that money changes
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now are generally regarded as more persist-
ent-that is, with greater impact upon per-
manent money-than they were in earlier pe-
riods. But is this really the case? To answer
this question would, ideally, require the iden-
tification of the exact relation used by individ-
ualsto estimate permanent money. This is a
formidable task, because the process deter-
mining money growth depends upon a variety
of factors, and also involves an unknown time
horizon.
Nonetheless, we can make crude approxi-
mations by estimating the extent to which a
money change typically is offset or reinforced
in subsequent periods; this can be estimated
from the pattern of money growth observed
over the period in question. Specifically, what
is the cumulative total of future money
changes that typically follows a rise in current
money above its long-run average-that is,
how much would we expect the money stock
to rise ultimately as the result of an initial
increase? This long-run impact should be rel-
atively small when money changes are largely
transient (i.e., offset in the future). Hence, in
our view, the impact might be larger during
the floating-rate period than during the fixed-
rate period; it might also be higher for the
U.S. than for other countries during the earlier
(fixed-rate) period.
Admittedly, this is a crude measure of the
effects of past upon permanent money. In par-
ticular, a pattern where a current increase is
followed by further changes, but ultimately is
completely offset, could substantially affect
permanent money if price-setters' horizons are
sufficiently short. For this reason, it will also
be useful to examine how the level of the
morey stock varies in the quarters following
the initial shock.
To measure these impacts, we have fitted a
simple (univariate) time-series model of
money-supply changes for each country for
two periods, 1958-67 and 1968-78, again using
quarterly (seasonally adjusted) data. Note that
each of these periods begins several years be-
fore the corresponding intervals used to esti-
mate the results reported in Table 1. This waswhere ~m(t) is the quarter-to-quarter change
in the logarithm of money. This relation can
also be written in a form where current money
growth depends upon past money changes and
done because of the assumption that individ-
uals would require some time to observe the
behavior of money before arriving at a final
notion of how to predict it; thus the relations
estimatedover these earlier periods may better
reflect individuals' expectations than relations
estimated for later periods. We then have the
following:
~m(t) c + al~m(t-l) +
a2~m(t-2) + o(t-l) +
b20(t-2) + b40(t-4) (4)
the current value only of o( ).27 In this, o( )
stands for money changes in excess of those
already anticipated on the basis of past money
changes..Its meaning can be seen from the
computation of the impact of money growth
on the l~vel of money in the long-run (Table
2).Assume·that money, after growing steadily
at its long-run average rate, rises by one per-
cent more in the current period; then o( ) is
equal to one percent. The long-run effect of
this increase on the level ofmoney then equals
the sum of the current and future money
changes generated by this "blip" in money
growth; it equals (1 + b i + b2 + b4)/(1 - a i
- a2). Of course this ultimate impact will take
some time for completion, and indeed this in-
Table 2
Summary of Univariate Time-Series Estimates for Changes
in Log Values of the Money Supply'
1958.1-1967.4 1968.1-1978.4
Long-run Long-run
Effects' F2 Adjusted R2 Effects' F2 Adjusted R2
Belgium .59 2.1 .12 6.8 2.8 .17
Canada .53 4.6 30 26.4 3.1 .20
France 8.0 7.4 .43 3.3 3.5 .22
Germany 1.9 2.3 .13 3.3 2.3 .13
Italy 1.2 5.0 .32 2.4 3.4 .22
Japan 1.1 8.5 .47 14.8 4.1 .27
Netherlands 1.2 2.3 .13 3.2 2.9 .18
Switzerland 5.3 1.3 .04 5.0 2.2 .12
United Kingdom 1.5 5.0 .32 2.4 2.2 .13
United States .33 4.3 .28 2.3 4.9 .31
'Ultimate effect upon future money of a I-percent unanticipated change in current money.
2Test of the significance of the entire set of parameters. A value above 2.3 is significant at the 5-percent level.
'The model contains moving average parameters at lags 1,2 and 4 and autoregressive parameters at lags one and two. Thus
the model can be written as,
Llm(t) = a"Llm(t-l) + a,Llm(t-2) + o(t) + b, o(t-l) + b20(t-2) + b40(t-4)
where Llm(t) is the quarterly first difference of the log of Ml, and the 00 are white-noise errors.
'For Canada for the first period, the estimated model is (barely) unstable in the sense that the changes in money following
the initial increase persistently grow in absolute value (however, the estimates are fairly 'close' to being stable). When the
model is reestimated dropping the second autoregressive term (a, assumed to equal zero), the response becomes stable.
The revised model implies a negative long-run impact for the earlier period ( .62), that is, an initial rise in money leads
ultimately to a fall in its level. For the second period, the long-run impact calculated from the revised model is 13.2;
however, the fit compared with the original model is substantially worse in this case.
41terval may encompass many quarters, depend-
ing upon the parameters of the above relation.
Table 2 summarizes the results of these es-
timations of relation (4): the first column lists
the ultimate impact of an (unanticipated) in-
crease of one percent in current money upon
future money, while the second and third col-
umns give measures of the significance and
goodness of fit of the time-series models. In
addition, Appendix Table A.l gives the esti-
mated impact of this increase upon the ex-
pected level of the money stock after four,
eight, twelve, and sixteen quarters. Again note
that the horizon over which permanent money
is calculated is unknown and may vary across
countries, so that the ultimate impacts listed
in Table 2 are only approximations of their
perceived impacts upon permanent money as
defined earlier.
28 Also, the magnitudes of the
estimates are often quite sensitive to the pre-
cise specification of the relation between cur-
rent and past money growth used to estimate
the long-run impacts. For both these reasons,
our results are most meaningful for what they
indicate about the relative persistence of
money changes for a given country over the
two time periods. Conclusions based upon the
absolute magnitudes of the impacts, and to a
lesser extent cross-country comparisons, are
probably less meaningful.
In view ofour earlier hypotheses, the results
reported here are at best very mixed. For most
countries, the long-run impact of a change in
current money upon the level of future money
increased between the earlier and later pe-
riods. The increase was quite sharp for Bel-
gium, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.S.-
countries which also showed an increase for
the measured impact of money upon prices.
However, the current money-future money im-
pacts actually fell for France and Switzerland,
although they showed an increase for the long-
run effect of money on prices. Canada's results
also were not consistent, and indeed those for
the first period were dynamically unstable; see
note 4 to Table 2. (With a slightly modified
version of the Canadian model, the long-run
impact for the first period was negative, im-
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plying that an initial rise in money leads ulti-
mately to a fall in its level, while the impact
was positive and well above unity in the second
period.) Again, some of our results seemed
implausible. For example, the long-run impact
reported for the U.S. in Table 2 was below
that found for most foreign nations, while the
Table 1 results would suggest that the opposite
pattern should hold, at least for the earlier
period. The lack of clear-cut results perhaps
should not be surprising, since stringent con-
ditions would have to apply if the results of
themoney-inflationrelationandcurrentmoney-
future money relation were to correspond.
One plausible explanation may be that individ-
uals use variables other than the money supply
itself to forecast future money. In any event,
the results suggest that either the theory de-
veloped earlier is over-simplified,29 or at least
that the monetary authorities' reactions to
other economic variables must be accounted
for explicitly, both in modeling individuals'
forecasts of permanent money and in estimat-
ing the money-inflation relation (1).
Taken as a whole, our results reveal more
possibilities than answers. The fact that the
measured impact of money on prices is gen-
erally not unity is more consistent with the
hypothesis that expectations about permanent
money affect the relation between inflation and
current and past money growth, than it is with
the mechanistic view that the relation is the
same regardless ofwhatever policy is followed.
Furthermore, these long-run impacts generally
shift between fixed-and floating-rate periods-
and shift in a fashion that is compatible with
our arguments as well as with widely-held
views about exchange-rate implications for na-
tional monetary policies. Finally, our argu-
ments are consistent with the Keran-Zeldes
finding that money's impact upon prices is gen-
erally above unity under a floating-rate regime.
However, our actual measurements of the per-
sistence of money changes do not accord very
well with the theory outlined here. In view of
the crudeness of these estimates, further de-
velopment and testing of models relating
money forecasts to prices seems warranted.III. Summary and Conclusions
It has long been noted that most economic
variables react to past as well as current con-
ditions. Except in a few cases, the sources of
these lags in economic behavior are not pre-
cisely known. Until fairly recently, most lags
were regarded as mechanistically determined
by institutional rigidities, adjustment costs,
and otherfactors which supposedly do not vary
with government policies. Empirical relations
derived from past data were commonly used
to simulate the effects of policy changes and
to predict economic conditions under policy
regimes very different from those prevailing
during the sample period. However, relations
that used to be regarded as stable have shifted,
often dramatically, with the accelerating infla-
tion of recent decades, and this shift has con-
siderably complicated the task of prediction
and policy analysis. Many analysts have con-
cluded from this experience that expectations
about future economic conditions, including
monetarypolicies, cruciallyinfluence the lagsin
economic relations-and that these expecta-
tions become more quickly adapted to chang-
ing conditions than once was thought.
This paper has considered the lags in a cru-
cial relation for forecasting and policy analy-
sis-the relation between inflation and current
and past money growth. We argue that the lag
in money's effect upon prices can be substan-
tially affected by individuals' expectations
about future money growth. This implies that
money-inflation forecasting relations will change,
at least eventually, when government policy
alters the relation between current and past
money growth and future money growth. The
estimates of the money-inflation relations for
several industrial countries seem quite consist-
ent with this conjecture. In particular, the
long-run impact of money on prices appears to
have shifted substantially between the fixed-
and floating-rate periods, and in .a plausible
fashion given the nature ofthose regimes. Fur-
thermore, those relations often do not show
the characteristics that would be expected if
they were invariant to government policies. In
particular, the long-run impact of money on
prices frequently does not equal unity, as
would be expected if those relations were in-
variant to policy.
Finally, we argue that the relative impact on
inflation of the (permanent versus transitory)
components of money growth may be stable
across policy regimes, or at least more stable
than under the standard forecasting relation.
In particular, we argue that prices will react
more to permanent money changes than to
transient changes. If true, this hypothesis pro-
vides at least a rough indication of how infla-
tion-forecasting relations can be adapted to
altered policies. Although the crude evidence
cited here does not confirm this hypothesis, it
could prove useful in further research as we
learn more about the money-supply process
and the expectations surrounding that process.
APPENDIX
This appendix sketches several approaches
to price determination that lead to price-per-
manent money relations similar to those dis-
cussed in Section II. Implications of this rela-
tion for the forecasting of inflation are also
developed. In the following-as in the text-
p(t) refers to the log of the price level, e(t) to
the log of aggregate demand, and m(t) to the
log of money.
Assume as well that aggregate demand varies
proportionately with the current money stock
and the (short-term) nominal interest rate, as
Three Simple Models
A. Interest rates, inflation expectations, and
prices
Suppose that prices vary immediately and
proportionately with aggregate demand as in,
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p(t) = e(t) (1)That is, current expenditure depends not only
upon current money but upon an average of
current and expected future money. Evidently
pet) then will respond proportionately to per-
manent money, as defined by the right-hand-
side of the above expression.
indeed is implied by the usual money-demand
relation. Then,
e(t) = met) - ai(t) , a > 0 (2)
where i(t) is the one-period interest rate. Fi-
nally suppose that i(t) is equal to a fixed real
rate, taken here as zero, plus an inflation pre-
mium:
i(t) = tpe(t + 1) pet) (3)
Now if bond-market participants are aware
ofthe relations (1) and (2), their price expec-
tations, and therefore interest rates, will be
based upon their forecasts of future money.
Substituting (1) into (2), that is,
pet) = met) - aCpe(t+l) - pet)) (4)
Taking the pet) on the right over to the left
and repeatedly substituting then gives,*
1 00 ( a )i
p(t) = 1+ a 2: 1+ a +
)""·0
,me(t+j); where ,meet) = met) (4)
Defining permanent money as the discounted
value ofpresent and future money in the above
gives an infinite-horizon analog to the relation
in the text. In arriving at this, rational expec-
tations in its strictest sense need not be in-
voked: (4') will be valid regardless of how
"rationally" future money is forecast. The re-
lation (4') effectively reflects a "Fisher" inter-
est-rate impact upon prices; the implications
of this for inflation were described in detail in
Cagan's classic article on hyperinflation. **
B. "Permanent" Money Demand
Suppose that (1) is valid but that now,
where the price is newly set at the beginning
of period t (and fixed through the next i-I
periods), and where we assume met) is known
althat point (this is not essential). The money
forecasts might also be discounted.****
In relating aggregate prices to money, we
must take account ofthe fact that contracts are
likely to be staggered (i.e. expire at different
times) and to be of different lengths. Suppose
first that all contracts are of the same length
but are staggered evenly in the following man-
ner: in each period, industries whose contracts
are being renegotiated account for the same
fraction (Vi) of aggregate expenditure. Defin-
ing the aggregate price index (in logs) as a
simple average of industry prices then gives,
Pi(t) = ~ [met) + ,meet + 1) +
1
...,m
C(t+i-l)] == m*(t) (5)
c.• Contracts and Pricing
A still simple but somewhat richer model of
permanent money and prices is based upon
contracts. Suppose in a given industry that
prices are set .for several periods, say i, at a
time. Imagine also that the supply ofoutput is
given exogenously, so that the task ofthe price
setter is essentially to forecast demand over
the life ofthe contract.*** Assume finally that
the value of industry sales in a given period is
a •fixed fraction of aggregate expenditure,
which in turn varies proportionately with cur-
rent money (i.e., e(t) met) ).
Now in each period, there will be a single
price which will allow the firms in the industry
to sell just the amount available, no more nor
less; define this as the "desired" price, since
if firms were not constrained by contract this
would be the price they would actually set. It
seems reasonable to suppose, then, that con-
tract prices will be set at some average of ex-
pected "desired" prices over the life of the
contract. Let p(t) now refer to the log of the
industry price. Then since "desired" prices
vary proportionately with money,
(2)




44p(t) = ~[m*(t- i + 1) +
I
m*(t-i+2) + ...m*(t)] (6)
Here the first term represents prices set in the
oldest non-expired contract. Thus, in contrast
to the earlier models, the contract model al-
lows for a lag between prices and permanent
money-as we will see below, a lag between
prices and actual money will be observed even
if this is not the case. This offers a potential
explanation of the Keran-Zeldes finding of an
apparently shorter lag between money and ex-
change rates than between money and prices.
Exchange rates are apt to respond immediately
to permanent money-i.e., transient money
changes will tend to be speculated out-while
the price response can be delayed because of
contracts.
Finally, the existence of different contract
lengths does not greatly alter conclusions
based upon (6). To each contract length there
corresponds a particular horizon for the cal-
culation of permanent money. When there are
different contract lengths, the current aggre-
gate price level will be a weighted average of
current and past values of these alternative
permanent-money aggregates.
The long-run effect here is unity. It is easy to
show that when current money changes are
where u(t) is a white noise. In effect the au-
thorities are expected to correct any "base-
drift" in the next period, since ,meet + 1) = m.
Then the price-money relation is,
Then at any time the forecast of future money
is simply today's observed level: thus m*(t)
= met) and,
pet) V2(m(t) + m(t-l)). (ll-b)
so that the long-run impact of money upon
prices is V2; this will be smaller of course for
longer forecasting horizons. In contrast, sup-
pose that money changes are purely random,




met) = m + u(t)
pet) = m + V4[(m(t) m) +
(m(t 1) m)]
met) = met-I) + u (t)
and current and past money given in the text.
Notice that the long-run impact of money on
prices measured from this-which is
V2(I- al- az ...)-depends upon the coeffi-
cients ofthe process (7) generating money, and
generally will not be equal to unity.
To see this more specifically, suppose first
that money is known and expected to follow
a given path with random but temporary de-
viations:
m*(t) 1/2[(1 al)m(t) - a2m(t - 1)
- a,m(t-2) + ...] (8)
sincem(t+I) = u(t+I) - alm(t) - azm(t-
1)... , so ,me(t+I) -alm(t)
azm(t-I).... Then substituting in (6)
pet) = V2[m*(t) + m*(t 1)]
V4[(I- at)m(t) + (I-at - az)m(t-1)
-(a2+a3)m(t 2)+...] (9)
Relation (9) is the standard relation of prices
Implications of Models
When prices depend upon forecasts offuture
money, as in the above, the usual forecasting
relation between pet) and current and past mO
depends upon how individuals use current in-
formation to predict money. To see this, sup-
pose that the price-permanent money relation
is as shown in (6). Assume first that money
follows a (invertable) stationary process-
known to individuals and used by them to fore-
cast-described by,
A(L)m(t) = u(t) , A(L) ==
1 + aiL + azL
2 + . . . (7)
where u(t) is a white-noise disturbance and
A(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L. To
simplify matters, suppose that the horizon over
which permanent money is forecast is two pe-
riods (i = 2). If individuals use only the past
history ofmoney in forecasting its future-that
is, if they employ (7)-permanent money can
be written as,
45Plainly, the relation used to forecast prices
then must include z(t). Conversely, the fact
that non-monetary variables are useful in "ex-
plaining" or predicting inflation in standard re-
lations does not necessarily mean that they can
directly affect prices, independently of money.
To summarize the implications of this view,
expected to be reinforced in the future, this
long-run impact can be greater than unity.
Hence the more persistent that money changes
are expected to be, generally the larger will be
the apparent long-run impact of money on
prices measuredfrom money-inflation forecast-
ing relations.
More generally, future money may be pre-
dicted from information other than its past;
letting z(t) stand for such additional informa-
tion (which will usually include past data), we
might then have,
m*(t) = B(L)m(t) + z(t). (12)
when prices respond to permanent money as
defined here:
i) The long-run impact of money on prices
measured from inflation-forecasting equations
will depend upon how future money is fore-
casted, and generally will not be unity.
ii) When current money changes are typi-
cally viewed as transient, the long-run impact
of money on prices will generally be less than
unity, and less than when such changes are
expected to be permanent or reinforced.
iii) Inflation-forecasting equations should in-
clude all variables used to forecast future
money, and not simply current and past money.
As these indicate, it generally will not be pos-
sible to test propositions about the causal links
between money and prices using only the em-
pirical relation between prices and current and
past money; the same point was made in a
slightly different context by Lucas (1970).
Table A.1
Impact of a One-percent Increase in Current Money Growth
on the Expected Future Level of the Money Stock*
1957-1969 1970-1979
Percent Increase in Money Stock Level Percent Increase in Money Stock Level
Expected After: Expected After:
4 8 12 16 4 8 12 16
Country Qtrs Qtrs Qtrs Qtrs Qtrs Qtrs Qtrs Qtrs
Belgium .22 .56 .58 58 2.32 4.79 5.90 6.41
Canada' .40 .35 .33 .30 3.53 8.06 11.62 14.47
France 2.23 4.30 5.60 6.44 2.47 3.33 3.32 3.32
Germany .85 1.46 1.70 1.80 2.54 3.30 3.30 3.30
Italy .34 1.I6 1.22 1.22 .81 2.09 2.31 2.36
Japan' .26 1.10 1.01 .99 3. ]() 7.22 9.83 11.53
Netherlands .62 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.50 2.81 3.09 3.16
Switzerland 2.38 4.02 4.73 5.07 5.41 513 4.94 4.97
V.K. 88 1.48 1.48 1.48 4.16 1.97 2.60 2.43
U.S.' .27 2.26 -1.53 28 2.03 2.77 2.78 2.78
*Results are based upon a simulation of the estimates summarized in Table II in the text.
'The results for Canada for the first period are unstable in that the absolute value of money changes (although not their
cumulative sum) increases over time. When the model is reestimated suppressing the second autoregressive term. the long-
run impact for the first period is negative and virtually complete after six quarters.
'The Japan results for the first period show considerable "cycling" in the first four quarters: after two quarters the expected
money stock level is up 1.8%, while it is up only .55% aftcr five quarters.
'The V.S. results for the first period again show substantial "cycling."
46FOOTNOTES
where i(t) is the interest rate, A is a matrix of lag polyno-
mials, and C is a vector of such polynomials, The lagged
relation between money and prices referred to in the text is
defined as the "reduced form" solution of this system where
prices depend only upon money: This is obtained by solving
1. The "long and variable lag" for nominal income and
money was first documented for the U.S. by Milton Fried-
man, in "The Lag in the Effect of Monetary Policy," in his
The Optimum Quantity of Money and Other Essays. See
also the article on "Inflation and Monetary Accommodation
in the Pacific Basin" by Michael Bazdarich in the Summer
1978 issue of this Economic Review, as well as the article
by Michael Keran and Stephen Zeldes in this issue.
2. See, for example Gordon (1976), pp. 201-02.
3. The conditions for money neutrality are fairly stringent.
First, transfers of wealth among individuals resulting from
price-level changes must not affect aggregate demand and
supplies. Second, open-market exchanges of money for
government bonds will not be neutral unless individuals
discount future tax liabilities in calculating their wealth, so
that for the "typical" individual, government bonds are not
net wealth. Furthermore, the proposition does not apply to
money-supply changes accompanied by variations in real
government expenditure or taxes. Finally, money neutrality
refers to changes in the level of money with its long-run
growth rate held constant; if anything, there is a consensus
that changes in the long-run money-growth rate are not
neutral.
4. Specifically, most economists would now agree that
money changes have negligible long-run impacts on real
output and unemployment, that is, the "Phillips" curve is
vertical in the long-run. This factor,combined with empirical
estimates of money-demand relations (where real balances
are generally a function of real output and interest rates)
suggests that a rise in money (with no change in its ex-
pected growth rate) will raise the price level proportionally.
5. Trends in real output and velocity enter because they
influence the real demand for money. This real demand can
be permanently affected by factors, such as financial inno-
vations, that are not easily summarized quantitatively-and
indeed are not always observable, and thus cannot be ac-
counted for explicitly. Since these factors then enter the
disturbance term in the empirical relation, the relation (1 'j
relating price and money changes is most often used; these
factors would cause the constant term relating the level of
prices and money to shift about during the sample period.
Consequently, this relation is less practical as a form for
estimation. For this reason, the empirical results referred to
later will be of the second form, and we will normally refer
to the money-growth inflation relation in the text.
6. In other words, we can imagine a system where prices,












the above system to obtain an equation relating price and
money changes only, This is the text relation (1) and it
includes all indirect effects upon prices of output and inter-
est rate responses to money, This fact makes it often difficult
to interpret the empirical counterparts of (1),
7. See Rutledge (1979) and (1977) for a more detailed
discussion.
8. This is the rationale implicit in Barro (1979).
9. Indeed, nearly all rational-expectations models imply that
economic decisions depend upon expectations of future
policy variables. Some concrete illustrations of this are de-
scribed in the Appendix.
10. Arthur Okun ("Inflation; its Mechanics and Welfare
Costs," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:2, 1975)
discusses the reasons why price fluctuations may be limited
by tacit agreement in what he describes as "customer mar-
kets." See especially pp. 358-73.
11. That is, decisions about inventory levels, work sched-
ules, etc" are all likely to depend upon firm anticipations of
"typical" patterns of behavior of variables affecting firm
costs and profits.
12. This is, of course, implied by the hypothesis of "rational
expectations"-but it is more general. Individuals may not
make use of all information potentially available, but they
are likely to adapt whatever forecasting techniques they do
use to changed policies, at least given enough time.
13. This observation is relevant to tests of the influence of,
(say) government deficits on prices. Suppose that the deficit
is found to be a significant variable, in addition to current
and past money, in a regression "explaining" inflation. Does
this imply that the deficit affects inflation independently of
money growth? The arguments in the text suggest that this
is not necessarily the case if the monetary authorities react
to deficits so that deficits provide a "signal" of future money
growth. As will become clearer in the next section, tests
aboutthe causes of inflation cannot generally be based upon
relations such as (1) alone. This point has been emphasized
by Lucas (1970).
14. In Britain, for example, the authorities define monetary
objectives for M-3, while in Japan targets are set for M-2.
See the OECD's Monetary Targets and Inflation (p. 27) for
an assessment of the stability of money-demand relations
using alternative aggregates. This finds M-2 inferior to M-1
for Germany, while M-2 is at best marginally "preferable" to
M-1 for Japan. The choice also does not seem clear-cut in
the U.K.; see also Goodhart and Crockett (1970).
15. Another reason for including this dummy variable is the
possible shift in the perceived long-run growth rate of
money-that is its unconditional mean-in several coun-
tries. If so, the models developed in the Appendix also imply
a shift in the constant term in a regression of price changes
on current and past money growth. This change does not
necessarily arise from the resulting change in interest rates
(although it may, at least in part). For example, in the simple
contracting model in the Appendix, there is no interest rate
impact on prices. However, a rise in the long-run money-
growth rate will lead to an increase in the "shift" parameter
used by rational forecasters to predict permanent money,
47and this "shift" parameter is included in the constant of a
standard inflation money growth relation.
The real balance correction (similar to the one used by
Keran and Zeldes for their article in this Review) is taken
over 12 quarters, in order to 'smooth out' any business-
cycle fluctuations in the real demand for money that might
be induced by variations in nominal money growth. Basi-
cally, this correction is designed to adjust for shifts in real
money demand that are unrelated to actual nominal money
changes but which tend to add 'noise' to the money-inflation
regression. An example of such a shift would be changes
in the real demand for various currencies as a result of the
switch from fixed to flexible rates, or changes due to financial
innovations that influence velocity. It should be noted that
this correction often affects the results substantially. Fre-
quently, the inclusion of this term substantially reduces the
regression standard error for the second period. Moreover,
the correction often substantially raises the estimate of
money's long-run impact upon prices for the second period.
Finally, in three cases the comparisons of the long-run im-
pacts between the two periods are affected by the correc-
tion: for Canada, the long-run impact declines from the first
to the second period when the correction is not included,
although again the change is fairly small and both impacts
remain well below unity; and for both Germany and the
Netherlands, the long-run impacts are negative in the sec-
ond period when the correction is not included (forGermany,
the dummy variable also substantially affects the results).
The results obtained by omitting the real money-demand
correction and dummy variable will be supplied upon re-
quest.
16. For example, suppose that an acceleration in money
growth is associated not only with an expectation of higher
future inflation but also with an increased risk of holding that
money. This increased risk may then reduce the real de-
mand for money in a way not captured by the interest rate
(i.e. it induces a shift in the real money-demand function).
17. Michael Darby ("Sterilization and Monetary Control un-
der Pegged Exchange Rates: Theory and Evidence," NBER
Working Paper #449, February 1980) also finds that foreign
countries had very considerable short-run control over their
domestic money stocks during the adjustable-peg regime.
This suggests a general lack of bias in the Table I results
resulting from "feedback" from prices to money operating
via reserve flows. It is important to note that this argument
refers to the short-run; in the long-run, foreign money stocks
probably would have had to conform to the trend in U.S.
money. Rudimentary tests for a causal relation from prices
to money were also run for the two periods. Some feedback
from prices to money was detected for Japan and the U.K.,
and possibly Germany, for the earlier period. Interestingly,
there was some evidence of a feedback for Italy and Japan
for the later period. These results will also be supplied upon
request.
18. This, admittedly, is something of an oversimplification,
in that firms will also have to estimate costs over the con-
tract period in setting prices. The simple model in the Ap-
pendix assumes that firm supply is essentially exogenous
and fixed, so that the firm's task is to estimate future de-
mand only. Taylor (1980) considers a more complex model
in which wages and price setting "interact," but one which
yields similar results to those developed here. In still more
complex models, decisions regarding prices, investment,
inventory, and output are all interdependent. In these cases,
the dependence of prices on expected future money is not
likely to be as simple as the relation described in the Ap-
pendix.
19. This horizon need not, of course, be the same for all
agents. As indicated in the Appendix, when prices are set
by contracts, the horizon for permanent-money calculations
may depend upon the contract length. This horizon may
also be infinite, as in the case where aggregate demand
depends upon interest rates. Finally, the calculation of per-
manent money might involve discounting of expected future
m( ).
20. In particular, output responses to money and their ef-
fects upon aggregate demand are ignored. Taylor (1980)
considers wage-price interactions.
21. See the Appendix for further details. Contracts provide
one possible explanation for the Keran-Zeldes finding (in
their article in this Review) that the lag between money and
exchange rates is shorter than that between money and
prices. Specifically, exchange rates are free to adjust im-
mediately to permanent money changes, while price re-
sponses may be delayed by contracts.
22. See the Appendix for further details. It should be noted
that this does not require that interest rates significantly
affect aggregate demand. Bilson (1978) has noted that the
long-run effect of money on exchange rates will depend
upon the characteristics of the money-supply process.
23. Lucas' (1970) statement applies here: "...the natural
rate hypothesis restricts the relationship of policy parame-
ters to behavioral parameters. It cannot be tested on a
behavioral relationship (Phillips curve, supply function, and
so on) alone." (p. 57) Indeed, this is an elegant and succinct
statement of the basic arguments in the text about the
money-inflation relation. But there is also wide acceptance
of the opposing view-see for example Gittings (1979)-
that causal restrictions should be imposed on money-
inflation relations.
24. Evidence that money has "accommodated" domestic
variables, such as government deficits and wage increases,
can be found in Gordon (1977).
25. See Logue and Sweeney (1978), pp. 153-55.
26. In practice, countries may have occasionally varied
money growth so as to limit exchange-rate fluctuations.
Something like this occurred in 1978, when large interven-
tion in support of the dollar was partly responsible for sub-
stantial overshooting of money-growth targets in Germany
and Switzerland. There is also evidence for Japan (see my
"Rational Expectations and Countercyclical Monetary Pol-
icy: The Japanese Experience" in the Summer 1978 issue
of this Review) that the monetary authorities reacted to
Japanese-U.S. price shifts after 1971. In short, money
abroad may still be somewhat constrained by exchange-
rate considerations, so that the current floating-rate regime
differs only in degree from the former fixed-rate regime.
27. The model included moving-average terms at lags one,
two, and four (see the notes to Table II) as well as two
autoregressive parameters at lags one and two. The third
lag was omitted, as it generally was not statistically signi-
ficant. The long-run effects reported in the table are of-ten quite sensitive to variations in the number of moving-
average or autoregressive terms; for this reason they should
be interpreted with considerable caution.
28. As indicated in the Appendix (see Section II), the meas-
ured long-run impact of money on prices will generally vary
with the horizon overwhich permanent money is forecasted.
Indeed, in the first example given there, an increase in
current money has no effect upon the long-run money
stock-but the long-run effect of money on prices as meas-
ured from the standard relation is positive, although below
unity.
29. Two possibly significant effects that I have largely ig-
nored are the influence ofunanticipated moneychangesand
the interaction of output adjustments and price changes. In
the rational-expectations model of Barro (1979) and others,
prices are supposed to react immediately and proportion-
ately to money changes that are expected (perceived). Un-
anticipated changes, however, push real output away from
its "natural" rate, and hence influence aggregate demand. In
this case, prices will react not only to forecasts of future
money but also to past errors in predicting money. This is
likely to lead to price-money relations that are more complex
than implied by the hypothesis developed in the text.
APPENDIX FOOTNOTES
'This is not the only technically admissable solution, al-
though it is economically the most sensible.
"Phillip Cagan, "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinfla-
tion," in Milton Friedman (editor) Studies in the Quantity
Theory of Money, pp. 25-117.
"'Thus the influence of fluctuations in wages and other
costs on output supply is ignored. Taylor ( ) considers
pricing based upon both wage and demand projections,
but the implications of his model are very similar to those
considered here.
""For example suppose that there is a loss from devia-
tions from the desired price that is proportional to the
difference of (the logs of) the actual and desired price.
Then the firm is apt to seek to minimize the discounted
value of such losses, which would lead to discounting of
money forecasts in the calculation of m'( ).
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